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A B S T R A C T   
INSIDER is an EU Horizon 2020 research project, within the topic NFRP-7 of the EURATOM programme, that 
aims to develop and validate a new and improved integrated characterization methodology and strategy for the 
nuclear decommissioning and dismantling operations (D&D) of nuclear power plants, and post-accidental land 
remediation of nuclear facilities under constrained environments. In line with this general objective, the defi-
nition and implementation of the practical considerations surrounding the radiological characterization of nu-
clear/radioactive facilities subject to a D&D programme is under development. . 
In-situ measurements are key for this radiological characterization. However, in some cases these measure-
ments have to be carried out under constrained conditions, which poses some challenges to their realization. A 
constrained environment is a general term that includes all types of environment that hinder the choice of a non- 
destructive in-situ measurement method. In the context of this paper, it is applied to different situations: 
radioactive levels of the area to be characterised, difficult accessibility of this area, type and properties of the 
materials contained in it, as well as the possible presence of other environmental hazards, such as asbestos, 
chemical and/or organic/biological ones. 
In this context, an analysis of the suitability of existing methodologies for in-situ measurements in constrained 
environment is being carried out. The first step to accomplish this task is to describe the constrained environ-
ments that could appear in the different nuclear/radioactive facilities and their respective challenges. 
This paper includes a description of the different constrained environments, showing their corresponding 
challenges and a classification of the constraints, and it provides a series of tables linking the installations and 
areas inside them with the different constraints that appear. In the case of the radioactive constraints, a 
description of the expected level of their impact depending on the different D&D steps also appears.   
1. Introduction 
The INSIDER project (H2020-Euratom) aims at further improving the 
management of contaminated materials in nuclear facilities subject to a 
decommissioning and dismantling (D&D) programme, as well as during 
post-accidental site remediation and clearance, by proposing a meth-
odology that allows the definition and selection of the most appropriate 
intervention scenarios,producing well-characterised radioactive waste 
for which storage and disposal routes are clearly identified. One of the 
different tasks defined to accomplish this is the optimisation of the 
radiological characterization process and thus, the analysis of the suit-
ability of existing methodologies for in-situ measurements in 
constrained environments (INSIDER, 2017). 
According to the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA, 2013), the term 
“radiological characterization” represents the determination of the na-
ture, location and concentration of radionuclides in a nuclear facility. It 
is a key element of the planning, controlling and optimising of decom-
missioning and dismantling (D&D) activities. It can be also considered as 
a continuous process, as adequate radiological characterization is of 
crucial importance in all stages of a decommissioning program or 
project, not least from a material and waste perspective. Radiological 
characterization plays a significant role in the decommissioning process 
of shut down nuclear facilities. An effective characterization allows the 
extent and nature of the contamination to be determined, thereby 
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providing crucial information to support facility dismantling, the man-
agement of material and waste arising (IAEA, 2004; IAEA, 2007), the 
protection of workers, of the public and the environment, and associated 
cost estimations (IAEA, 1998a,b). 
A conventional radiological characterization process may cover a 
wide range of evaluation objectives during a D&D project: doubt 
removal, identification of hot spots, spatial extent of contaminated 
materials, dose rate estimation for workers, monitoring of the decon-
tamination work and final survey (IAEA, 1998a; NEA, 2017). In this 
context, it is a whole process that enables a different statistical process to 
ensure a suitable sampling strategy and plans, as well as the definition of 
in-situ measurement techniques that are adapted to each specific area 
and the selection of the best fit for purposes in lab analytical techniques. 
The statistical analysis, as well as the in-situ measurements, should be 
able to provide a radiological mapping of the area, whereas minimizing 
and properly defining the number and position of samples to be taken for 
remote control in the laboratory. This process contributes to the opti-
misation of the financial needs of the D&D process and helps to shorten 
it (Varley and Rush, 2011). 
As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the NEA pointed out (NEA, 2014), one of the challenges in 
this radiological characterization process is the in-situ measurements 
and more specifically, the characterization in and around structures that 
are difficult to access. From a broader point of view, the challenge is the 
in-situ measurement techniques to be used in any constrained 
environment. 
A constrained environment is a general term that includes all types of 
environment that hinder the choice of a non-destructive in-situ mea-
surement method due to their ability to compromise the radiological 
characterization by disturbing to measurement equipment or affecting 
in-situ data due to interfering factors. 
There is already a large number of publications devoted to D&D 
processes and to radiological characterization and in-situ measure-
ments. Most of them are focused on a specific type of facility (Kalb et al., 
2000; Danish Decomminsionning , 2012; Cruickshank, 2012; JRC, 2014; 
ASN, 2016 Matsumoto, 2016); or on how a constraint affects the oper-
ation of a particular piece of equipment (Moszynski et al., 2006; Bagi-
nova et al., 2018; Tsitsimpelis et al., 2019). There are also several studies 
establishing the different general factors or constraints that influence 
the overall project implementation of D&D strategies (Suh et al., 2018 
and references therein; PerkoMonken-Fernandes et al., 2019). The main 
environmental constraints affecting in-situ measurement technique de-
cisions, however, are not well identified and a systematic review of 
environmental constraints and the type of facilities and areas they 
appear in has not been addressed either. This is why it was included as 
an activity in the INSIDER project. 
In this context, the present paper introduces, defines and analyses 
these constraints to highlight their influence on in-situ measurements 
during every part of the life cycle of the D&D project in each particular 
facility. Its aim is to synthesise the disturbing and affecting factors that 
could compromise the radiological characterization. This is the first 
challenge that must be dealt with before being able to recommend a 
specific in-situ measurement technique for each type of area inside a 
particular installation, which is one of the final objectives of this IN-
SIDER project. 
In this paper, the environmental constraints considered are con-
tained in one of the following categories:  
 radioactive levels of the area to be characterised  
 difficult accessibility of this area  
 type and properties of the materials contained in it 
 possible presence of other environmental (chemical and/or biolog-
ical) hazards 
Each of these situations presents a different set of properties. Each 
one can affect the measurement process differently and also the 
interpretation of the data obtained. 
All of the environmental constraints considered here can be consid-
ered to be technical constraints. However, there are other constraints 
which can be considered to be management constraints, which also 
affect the selection of in-situ measurements techniques. These are 
related to resources, staff and financial and security issues (IAEA, 2006; 
IAEA, 2008). Therefore, since they are not linked to the site itself, these 
management constraints are beyond the scope of this paper. 
In this paper, the decision process used to define the best in-situ 
measurement technique, depending on the investigation objectives 
and on the different environmental and management constraints, is 
described in section 2. Section 2 also details environmental constraints, 
described as any type of constraint that hinders the choice of a non- 
destructive in situ measurement method during a D&D project. Man-
agement constraints are also briefly introduced in this section 2. 
Finally, in sections 3 and 4, the constrained environments under 
consideration are classified according to their corresponding challenges. 
For this purpose, the considered installations, along with the different 
areas that are expected to be found in these, have been classified in 
different groups, with their different constrained environments also 
listed. Certainly, it should be taken into account that, for a specific area, 
the existing constraints could change along the different steps of the 
D&D process and then, the methodologies to be used for the in situ 
characterization would have to be adapted accordingly. 
In summary, this paper provides a description of the constraints 
affecting the decision process of in situ measurements, showing their 
corresponding challenges and also listing in which areas of nuclear/ 
radioactive installations they could appear along the different phases of 
any D&D programme. 
It must be noted that in this paper, post-accidental site remediation 
and clearance are not taken into account, neither as a specific “instal-
lation” or “area” when defining constrained environments nor the 
challenges they provoke, as they are very particular for each situation. 
However, it is considered that some conclusions regarding the choice of 
in-situ measurement techniques could be drawn in light of the classifi-
cation made in this paper. 
This paper does not claim to be an exhaustive guide containing all 
the possible nuclear or radioactive installations, nor all the possible 
constrained environments. The main objective of this paper is to 
describe those situations that appear most often and those that are most 
challenging when they are under D&D process. 
2. Decision process: defining the best in-situ measurement 
technique 
2.1. Overview 
Collecting radioactivity data for radiological characterization is 
essential in order to be able to evaluate the benefits and performance of 
the D&D process. Some data can be obtained by direct in-situ mea-
surements or by obtaining a smear, scratching, or drilling a specific 
sample followed by in-lab analysis, with the in-lab analysis being more 
accurate and less prone to contamination or interference, although it is a 
more time-consuming and resource-intensive method. 
For a specific area inside a certain installation, the choice of an in- 
situ measurement technique will depend on a set of information ob-
tained through a complete decision process that starts by defining the 
investigation objectives of the characterization process, and hence of the 
in-situ measurement, and finishes by choosing not only the most suitable 
in-situ measurement technique but also the data interpretation meth-
odologies and the response protocol for the in-situ activity. This decision 
process will depend on the environmental constraints or other con-
straints that the area may have, including those of management. 
Moreover, it should also be taken into account that the same area can 
have different environmental constraints throughout the whole 
decommissioning process (see section 3), which will condition the final 
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choice of the in-situ measurement technique. 
For each facility subject to a D&D program, the investigation ob-
jectives of the radiological characterization and, thus, of the in-situ 
measurements, are given by project/authorities and can be in terms of 
fissile materials, dose-rate levels, radioactive activities, radionuclides, 
etc. Moreover, the description and historical information of the site are 
necessary background information and complete the defined investiga-
tion objectives to accomplish the decision process (NEA, 2013). 
Generally, before starting the first stage of the D&D project, a deep 
understanding of the facility can provide valuable preliminary data to 
start the process and, accordingly, documentation about the past history 
and events of the facility has to be reviewed (IAEA, 2002; Rossini et al., 
2018). When information about the distribution of the source in the 
system or place is not available, characterization often aims to establish 
it. Thus, assumptions about the activity distribution have to be defined. 
According to radiation transport models, large uncertainties can result 
from lack of knowledge or from mistakes in the radioactive distribution 
assumption (Magnox Ltd, 2012). Therefore, at each phase of a D&D 
program, collecting relevant preliminary data is essential to consolidate 
the feasibility of the in-situ characterization. 
Based on this preliminary information and the analysis of the envi-
ronmental constraints present, it is possible to determine the exact lo-
cations for in-situ measurements needed, as well as the most suitable 
equipment and methodologies to be used. This process is named “system 
definition”. At the same time, it is essential to carry out an analysis of the 
resources, quality, safety and security issues, that is of the management 
constraints. This process, named “intervention definition”, is related to 
the response protocol of the in-situ activity and could condition the final 
decision about the in-situ measurement technologies beyond the 
environmental constraints. . 
The whole decision process can be summarized as in Fig. 1. 
The top blue arrows in Fig. 1 represent the environmental constraint 
categories that must be overcome to properly define the system, and the 
bottom arrows show the management constraints that condition the 
selection of the intervention definition. Both should be taken into ac-
count to define the in-situ measurement techniques and methodologies, 
starting with the characterization objectives. 
All these constraints, both environmental and management ones, are 
described in the following subsections. However, only those regarding 
the system definition (environmental ones) are deeply analysed and 
considered in order to classify and categorize the areas and installations 
in this paper. 
2.2. Environmental constraints 
The in-situ measurements are mainly based on non-destructive assay 
methods to detect all types of ionizing radiation emitted by radionu-
clides α, β, photons (X- or γ-rays) and neutron emissions, in the item 
under investigation. The choice of the best in-situ measurement meth-
odology is made with regard to the technical constraint categories 
(radioactivity, accessibility, materials and other environmental haz-
ards), as previously stated. 
Specific constraints that are included in each one of these constraint 
categories are presented in Fig. 2 and explained in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
It should be taken into account that each constraint affects the in-situ 
measurement and, thus, the radiological characterization, in a different 
way. In some cases, the detector may turn out to be physically damaged 
Fig. 1. From characterization objectives to in-situ methods and protocol.  
Fig. 2. Environmental constraint categories and specific constraints to be taken into account during the choice of in-situ measurement techniques.  
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or its characteristics compromised. However, in other cases it is the 
interpretation of the obtained data that could be compromised. For 
example, the radioactive source distribution assessment can be badly 
done because of the porosity of the source or the high background 
conditions. All these consequences can be minimised by selecting the 
appropriate in-situ measurement systems and methodologies. In this 
paper, both possibilities of interfering factors are considered. 
This classification leads to the identification of different constrained 
environments in each facility. The way in which each of them affects the 
in-situ measurements is explained in more detail below. 
2.2.1. Radioactivity 
A high radioactive level is a major constraint of characterization in a 
nuclear/radioactive environment. Obviously, it causes difficulties for 
human intervention and requires special equipment (i.e. robotics, leak 
tight uniforms) in order to protect the people. It should be considered 
that different radioactive levels result in different in-situ measurement 
strategies. 
Therefore, we can identify two ways in which radioactivity affects 
measurements: the ones coming from the high levels of radiation 
(mainly appearing as high gamma or neutron dose rates and high radi-
ation fluxes in accelerator type installations) and others coming from 
contamination. Both are considered here. 
It is assumed, for a same area, this radioactive level varies during the 
different phases of a decommissioning process, and the investigation 
method should be adapted at each phase. Irradiation constraints are 
present upstream during the decommissioning process and pre- 
dismantling phase, and should decrease in the remediation and final 
phase. 
2.2.1.1. Radiation constraints. A measurement in high radiation level 
environment is very challenging and can affect measurements in several 
ways, such as, signal discrimination, detection performance, dead time 
issues and background corrections that must be considered when doing 
data interpretation and analysis after measurement. So, one needs to be 
very careful in the choice of detectors and their settings as well as its 
associated electronics. 
Signal discrimination issues can happen in presence of different type 
of radiation fields producing interferences in the response of the de-
tector. In the case of neutron detectors, particular attention needs to be 
given to Gamma Rejection Ratio (GRR) which is the intrinsic response of 
the neutron detector to the presence of a gamma ray field when no 
neutron source is present, or Gamma Absolute Rejection Ratio in the 
presence of neutrons (GARRn) regarding the absolute neutron detection 
efficiency in the presence of neutrons and gammas. Thus, if the gamma 
radiation level is sufficiently high the amplitude rejection efficacy can be 
reduced. At high rates, pulse pile-up effect can make peak amplitudes 
from gamma rays become considerably larger than any individual 
neutron pulse, therefore distorting the rejection system (Knoll, 2010; 
Kouzes et al., 2010). 
For some other systems based on the peak amplitude to discriminate 
signals (e.g., those from alpha and beta emissions in proportional 
counters), the same pulse pile-up effect due to high levels of radiation 
can alter peak amplitudes and reduce the effectiveness of the crosstalk or 
spill over corrections that account for the discrimination of signals and 
their correct assignment. All these signal discrimination problems may 
lead to problems related to the efficiency calibration (Knoll, 2010). 
High radiation levels also lead to deterioration of detection perfor-
mance and to a high decrease lifetime of detectors themselves and also of 
their associated electronics. Exposure over long periods to high levels of 
radiation can produce damaging chemical reactions in gas detectors, or 
cause crystal defects in the structure of the detectors (Tsoulfanidis and 
Landsberger, 2015). For example, in the case of BF3 (Boron Trifluoride 
Neutron) detectors, at very high gamma rates, chemical changes can 
occur in the sensitive gas volume due to molecular disassociation, 
altering the pulse height spectra coming from neutron-induced events. 
In some extreme cases, these chemical changes can result in permanent 
damage to the detector. (Knoll, 2010). 
In semiconductor detectors and particularly in High Purity Germa-
nium (HPGe) detectors, high levels of neutrons can produce damage on 
the crystal lattice by displacing atoms. Effects on HPGe are more pro-
nounced compared to thinnest silicon detectors, as they usually have 
large volume and long charge collection paths (Ahmed, 2007). It must be 
mentioned that some of the new developed detectors have high resis-
tance to radiation damage (Knoll, 2010). 
Scintillators performance can also be affected by high radiation level 
environments. Radiation damage causes degradation in the scintillation 
output of plastics and some inorganic scintillators also worsen after 
exposure to severe radiation fluxes (Knoll, 2010). In the case of the 
avalanche photodiode, the damage mechanism is the same as in semi-
conductor detectors. 
High radiation levels may also affect the performance of electronic 
components of the detectors. Changes start taking place inside the de-
vice well before it reaches the point of failure. X/gamma rays generally 
interact with matter by ejecting electrons mainly via photoelectric or 
scattering (Compton) effects – at least in the energy range below one 
MeV. They do not affect the crystal structure or atomic order of the 
detector material, but they produce a large number of free electrons, and 
of course positively charged ions (or holes). If the material is conductive, 
the electrons quickly recombine, and the equilibrium in the material is 
restored. However, if the material is an insulator, the most energetic 
electrons often get ejected leaving behind a permanent positive charge. 
Integrated circuits rely on one or more insulating or dielectric layers to 
separate conductors and help control electric fields inside the device. 
Charge build-up in these layers directly modifies the underlying electric 
fields, and therefore the charge transport properties of the silicon. In a 
CCD this means that the charge transfer becomes inefficient and the 
device quickly stops working. In a CMOS transistor it means that the 
threshold voltage of the transistor slowly shifts, until the device is either 
always on or completely closed off. Digital devices, as well as carefully 
designed analog devices, are able to tolerate moderate amounts of 
threshold voltage shifts, enabling them to continue to function normally 
until the transistors stop working and the device definitively fails 
(Hopkinson and Mohammadzadeh, 2004). 
Dead-time losses are well-recognized drawbacks in counting and 
spectrometry systems, in-situations where there are high radiation levels 
with their associated high counting rates. Losses up to several per cent 
may occur due to the electronic dead time of the system. Some detectors 
have very low associated dead time, like organic scintillators but Geiger- 
Müller has the largest one (Knoll, 2010; Tsoulfanidis and Landsberger, 
2015). Several hardware and software methods are available to reduce 
or to correct for electronic dead-time in certain circumstances, but they 
shall be considered in advance when undertaking the suitable selection 
of detection systems. 
Background correction issue is also altered in high radiation level 
environments. In the case of gamma rays, the fact is that high radiation 
levels may imply high levels of counts in some energy channels of 
spectrometry systems under the peaks corresponding to the analysed 
source. Interfering radiation can be observed as a result of the interac-
tion of primary gamma rays with the structural and shielding materials 
around the detector, through processes like Compton scattering, sec-
ondary annihilation photons through pair production and characteristic 
X-rays from photoelectric effect. This provokes a high level of back-
ground along the whole spectrum that can prevent the detection of some 
peaks from the analysed source with lower count rates, depending on the 
resolution of the spectrometry system. This effect can be expected to 
increase with the active volume of the detector. In some cases, high 
levels of radiation from neutrons can create some activation reactions in 
the detector, generating peaks from their gamma rays in the spectra 
(Baginova et al., 2018) that may cause interference and increase the 
background. 
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Background from high radiation levels usually needs development of 
specific characterization gears to reduce it, such as high efficiency col-
limators or background signal compensation. The use of collimators, due 
to their volume and weight, may limit the way of accessing the mea-
surement point, creating accessibility constraints, which are considered 
later. In some situations of high radiation levels, if possible, alternative 
access to the point under investigation may be considered as a way to 
minimize its influence. After measurement, post data treatment may also 
be necessary to ensure the correct source distribution assessment of a 
local area in a high dose rate background. 
If high dose rates cause problems for human intervention, alternative 
and special means of measurement techniques must be selected to ac-
count for radiation protection concerns for technicians. Among this 
special equipment, telescopic radiation meters, use of robots, special lift 
gears or unmanned aerial vehicles can be found available (NEA, 2013). 
2.2.1.2. Contamination constraints. Radioactively contaminated mate-
rials arise from the decommissioning of all nuclear facilities and are due 
to the deposition of some radioactive materials transported during the 
operation of the facilities. Contamination constraints have led to the 
development of particular intervention means (robots, leak tight uni-
form, etc. (NEA, 2013)) which can complicate in-situ measurements, not 
only because of contamination background, but also as a consequence of 
the material confinement of the electronics. 
Special care needs to be taken when there is a minimal possibility of 
contamination of the detector. The solution is achieved through 
confinement of the detector and its electronics with a sufficient 
guarantee. 
However, this way of protecting from contamination can complicate 
in-situ measurements as it can cause heat damage to electronics and/or 
produce detection variation of energy spectrum due to the modification 
of the temperature of the electronics. This is the case for scintillation 
detectors, leading to problems related to an adequate energy and FWHM 
calibration (Ahmed, 2007). 
This protection can also produce radiation attenuation, important in 
the case of alpha and beta radiation, leading to problems related to an 
adequate efficiency calibration (Knoll, 2010). 
Sometimes, if contamination has penetrated into the matrix of the 
materials investigated, like contamination of porous materials that are 
not protected by any coating, surface contamination monitors are no 
longer valid and gamma ray spectrometry must be made and some core 
samples will also be required for analysis in laboratory to establish the 
depth profile and the penetration depth. 
2.2.2. Materials 
Material constraints represent all constraints linked to the physical 
ones for both human interventions and also those that could lead to 
dysfunction of detectors and to data misinterpretation. In order to 
achieve a successful performance of the detector system in different 
possible scenarios, the detector response should be investigated as a 
function of different environmental parameters like temperature and 
humidity. Moreover, the radiological characterization experience with 
Magnox (Magnox Ltd, 2012), especially on Ion Exchange resin, points 
out that the radiation transport model which relates measured dose rate 
to 137Cs activity, lays on distribution assumption (e.g. activity and resin 
heterogeneity), where large uncertainties can result. Uncertainty also 
arises in the empirical or mathematical detector calibration, including 
differences between the assumed and the true source distribution (i.e. 
differences in geometry, density and chemical composition). 
2.2.2.1. Liquid constraint. Immersive or high humidity measurement is 
very challenging and needs particular technologies and means of 
intervention. Most often, technologies when this constraint is of 
particular relevance, consists of developing special mechanical equip-
ment to protect a standard detector, with particular attention to the 
interface and electrical connection. 
The presence of liquids can alter some detector performances in 
different ways. 
Some inorganic crystal detectors (particularly scintillators like NaI 
(Tl) or CsI(Na)) are hygroscopic, which means they are easily damaged 
when exposed to moisture in air at normal humidity levels. Therefore, 
the hermetic seals used in these types of detectors must be protected at 
all times. Similarly, it is advisable to never expose them to mechanical 
shock that may crack or chip the seals. Because hydration adopts some 
colour, it is an excellent absorber of photons in the visible domain and 
will significantly degrade the scintillation light output and thereby the 
detection efficiency, so that the detector performance deteriorates. 
Other scintillators (e.g. Pure CsI, CsI(Tl) and BaF2) that are not hygro-
scopic can be also damaged by drops of moisture or excessive conden-
sation (Saint-Gobain, 2016). 
Spurious pulses of about the same size as those from the real signal 
can sometimes appear and are due to fluctuations in leakage currents 
through insulators, particularly under high humidity environments 
(Knoll, 2010). In DC ion chambers operated with ambient air as the fill 
gas, the volume recombination rate increases in case of high humidity, 
altering the ionization current measured (Knoll, 2010). 
Because most fluids attenuate particles, interpretation of immersive 
measurement is also challenging and requires more precision in the 
measurement position. As stated in the contamination subsection, par-
ticle attenuation leads to problems related to an adequate efficiency 
calibration that must be considered. 
2.2.2.2. Air constraint. Air also affects the performance of detectors, 
especially in the case of soft radiation detection which only lightly 
penetrates the materials and in the case of temperature sensitive 
detectors. 
Alpha and beta detection is very sensitive to the density of air be-
tween the radiation source and the detector. The ionizing radiation 
becomes more absorbed and scattered when the density of air grows, 
which depends on pressure and temperature. Readings from ionization 
cameras and air-kerma monitors, for example, have to be corrected for 
air density, for any difference between the conditions met during their 
calibration and those found during measurements (Knoll, 2010). 
Contamination counter readings are also affected by the properties of 
the air that the radiation has to travel before entering into them. 
As regards temperature, detectors should not be left near heating 
elements, sun-warmed surfaces, radiator or air conditioners, as they are 
intended for use in a normal laboratory environment. 
Moreover, some detectors for gamma ray spectrometry (particularly 
scintillators like NaI(Tl) and LaBr3) are highly sensitive to temperature 
changes (IAEA, 2017). The photomultiplier is sensitive to temperature 
changes, as well as to stray magnetic fields. Silicon and avalanche 
photodiodes are also prevented in operations at elevated temperatures 
(Knoll, 2010). HPGe detectors are unaffected by changes in ambient 
temperature or magnetic field. However, temperature also affects elec-
tronics associated to these detectors, and can cause deviation of mea-
surement on the energy range of interest. This can lead to large 
uncertainties or misinterpretation of in-situ measurements. When it is 
possible, one of the solutions consists in performing measurements in a 
constant temperature environment (for example, if the temperature 
varies along the day, measurements can be done only every morning), or 
pay special attention to in-situ calibration. In a last resort, a temperature 
compensation system, based on stabilization schemes, can also be 
implemented on detectors, for energy calibrations compensating gain 
adjustments by other electronic means. 
2.2.2.3. Consistency constraint. Good knowledge of the materials to be 
characterised is essential for the success of the in-situ investigation. In 
most cases, this constraint significantly affects the data interpretation 
after measurement more than the in-situ equipment. Additionally, the 
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type of materials being analysed during radiological characterization 
sometimes hinders a good performance of this characterization. 
Regarding material data, in the case of gamma spectrometry, in most 
cases, some modelling of source distribution and the scene around it, as 
a way to calculate transfer functions, using mathematical and geomet-
rical analysis, is needed. When structures or systems are complex, the 
production of accurate models is hard. Beyond the physical properties, 
involved in the interactions between radiation and materials, and 
affecting the measurements, some other factors could be noticed, 
highlighting the necessity of good material knowledge (IAEA, 2003). 
While radiological characterization is performed through gamma 
spectrometry and the use of Monte Carlo techniques for modelling, 
certain assumptions about the distribution of the radioactivity source in 
the material analysed must be made that might be based on previous 
information about the site. Very often, it is assumed that the activity 
concentration in the material is uniformly distributed across a surface, 
or that it is homogenous throughout the material from which radiations 
reach the detector. Some sampling is also required (in particular, core 
samples) to determine the depth profile and the maximum penetration 
depth. The source distribution may be approximated by uniform dis-
tribution as a first approach in some cases when an approximate esti-
mation of the specific activity concentration (in terms of Bq/g or Bq/m3) 
of an extended source is required. In other cases the assumption of a 
surface source (limited only by the shielding afforded by passage of 
radiation through air) it is more advisable and very often an exponen-
tially decreasing function that relates the activity concentration to depth 
is assumed. It must be considered that the mixing of the source with the 
materials or small undulations in the surface will greatly reduce the 
radiation flux arriving at the detector in comparison with a theoretical 
estimate (IAEA, 1998b). 
In other cases, for example, direct measurements of alpha-emitting 
and beta-emitting radionuclides from porous (e.g. wood) and volu-
metric (e.g., soil, water) materials are hardly possible as they are 
generally performed by placing the detector on or near the surface to be 
measured and only particles from the surface are recorded. Thus, these 
measurements are generally restricted to relativity smooth, imperme-
able surfaces such as concrete, metal, or drywall where the activity is 
present as surface contamination. However, special instrument such as 
the long range alpha detector, large area gas-flow proportional counter 
or arrays of beta scintillators have been developed to measure the con-
centration in soil under certain conditions. 
NEA (2013) points out that radiological protection coating can 
represent an obstacle for radiological characterization. The use of pro-
tective coating on metallic and building surfaces against contamination 
is effective for easy decontamination during the operational phase for 
radiation protection purposes. However, it is often found to be an 
obstacle for radiological characterization: in many cases this coating has 
been refurbished by applying a new layer on top of existing ones without 
full decontamination of the lower layer, which is acceptable from the 
point of view of radiation protection for the personnel. Multiple layers 
shall, however, render measurements that have been carried out on the 
topmost layer with contamination measurement devices useless, as such 
measurements do not detect activity in greater depths. In cases where 
multiple layers are discovered only afterwards, extensive 
re-investigation or reliance on samples shall be needed. Similar con-
siderations apply to building surfaces where the penetration depth has 
been incorrectly determined. 
According to the NEA (2013), the use of certain decontamination 
techniques may lead to changes in nuclide vector, which may affect the 
planning of the radiological characterization process. In particular, 
chemical decontamination methods have the potential to selectively 
reduce the amount of certain elements (e.g. metals) while not or slightly 
affecting radionuclides (e.g. actinides), thus altering the composition of 
residual contamination in percentage terms (for example, the percent-
age of alpha emitters would increase). This would render any charac-
terization aiming at derivation of nuclide vectors prior to the application 
of the decontamination process useless. 
2.2.3. Accessibility 
The accessibility not only to the site but also to the room or specific 
place is not always easy when in-situ measurements should be carried 
out. Thus, during the planning process it is necessary to consider access 
logistics, including the ability to physically enter the site for any 
equipment brought. It should also be considered whether there are any 
overhead or underground utilities, which may impact the investigation. 
Different aspects related to the accessibility constraint are the shape and 
size of the area (presence of clutter environment, presence of corridors 
or tunnels and height) and the case of subsurface investigations. 
The constraints of working, such as access configuration in a chal-
lenging operational environment, require the use of approaches and 
experimentation with innovative techniques. 
Another aspect to consider is that, depending on the nearby envi-
ronment around the point where measurements are to be carried out and 
as the walls surrounding the detector increase the radiation background 
of the detector through radiation scattering on them, high efficiency 
collimators and background signal compensation shall be considered. 
But, the use of collimators increases the accessibility constraint due to 
their weight and size. (IAEA, 1998b). 
2.2.3.1. Configuration constraint. In corridor/tunnels or clutter envi-
ronments, the lack of distance which impacts on solid angle can modify 
measurement strategies. To keep the optimum solid angle, it could be 
necessary to reduce measurement distance. Thus, to measure a same 
object, it could be necessary to multiply characterization zones. 
In the case of using gamma cameras, even though much progress has 
been made in their technologies, poor angular resolution is still a limi-
tation that makes it impossible to precisely and quickly localize radio-
active hotspots that are placed far from a robot by use of a single image 
(Ardiny et al., 2019). 
Regarding accessibility of detectors for some narrow spaces, the 
telescoping handle of radiation detector allows for greater versatility. 
Smaller detector heads mounted on flexible tubes for easy head angle 
adjustment may be selected instead of large volume detectors. Some 
teleoperated pipe crawler systems were developed to perform visual and 
radiological investigations of the interior of pipelines (IAEA, 1998a). 
Where HPGe detectors are needed, as they operate at cryogenic 
temperatures, dewar flasks with a certain volume, filled with liquid ni-
trogen are routinely used. However, newer HPGe with portable 
electrically-cooled systems can now operate in portable mode with easy 
access to difficult areas. 
Regarding accessibility of equipment for high spaces, logistically 
special lift gears are needed. In that case, heavy collimators are hardly 
implementable on lift systems. Moreover, measurements at height 
require the signal from detector to be recovered to the treatment elec-
tronic or computer as well as wireless technologies. 
2.2.3.2. Subsurface. The majority of subsurface investigations concern 
nuclear geophysics, which is an important part of investigations in the 
decommissioning process. The instruments used for nuclear geophysical 
measurements commonly occur in basic configurations of sample, 
source and radiation detector. In all these configurations, the radiation 
detected for monitoring the geophysical process may be X rays, neu-
trons, alpha particles or gamma rays. If radionuclide identification is 
needed, gamma ray spectrometry is usually carried out with either 
scintillation detectors or high resolution germanium detectors. Howev-
er, both types of detector are somewhat fragile for in-situ measurement 
in subsurface. For this reason, more rugged scintillation spectrometers 
using photodiodes instead of photomultipliers are advisable, although 
some limitation currently exist to the small sizes of detectors. CdTe or 
CZT semiconductor spectrometers are available in small sizes and can be 
used in in-situ down-hole logging operation, but they have significantly 
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poorer resolution than HPGe detectors (Knoll, 2010). In addition, probes 
cannot be used where the soil is laden with rocks and boulders due to 
possible probe or pipe breakage. 
During in-situ operation, detectors are submitted to all environ-
mental constraints (humidity, temperature, consistency and also natural 
radioactivity). The difficulty of collimation also requires a particular 
approach of background irradiation level, for instance led by geo-
statistical approach. Measurements made where high natural radiation 
levels are present need significant post-measurement corrections, 
depending on the energy resolution of the detector chosen. 
2.2.4. Other environment hazards 
When performing investigations there is a need to consider other 
environmental hazards that can affect worker safety and so they 
complicate the characterizations operations and the measurement 
planning, either by reducing available time of operations or special 
cleaning operation before intervention, but they can also affect some 
measurement techniques. 
2.2.4.1. Asbestos. As in other parts of industry, nuclear plants were 
built with asbestos insulation to protect the machinery (such as boilers, 
pipes and turbines) producing intense amounts of heat. Therefore, 
asbestos risk still exists and has to be managed from a personal protec-
tion point of view. For instance, cutting into asbestos insulation would 
make fibers airborne, where they could be easily inhaled. Over time, 
lodged fibers could develop into cancerous tumours or dangerous tissue 
scarring. If not removed, intervention in asbestos environment requires 
special tight gear. Thus considering the presence and location of 
asbestos is particularly important to ensure worker safety and to develop 
the appropriate work methods. Presence of asbestos does not affect the 
measurement itself but determines the measurement planning and ways 
to develop it, like using automated or remotely controlled power tools as 
asbestos presence can limit the accessibility (Larsson et al., 2013). 
2.2.4.2. Chemical hazards. Chemical hazards arise from the composi-
tion of the original construction materials, chemicals used in operational 
processes and chemical spills and incident associated with the facility. 
According to the NEA (NEA, 2017), important chemical hazards can be 
reactive metals, volatile organic compounds and other reactive chemical 
compounds. 
Taking this kind of risk into account, it is particularly important for 
worker safety and can restrict the radioactive characterization possi-
bilities in terms of the measurement planning and ways to develop it, as 
with asbestos. 
The analysis of the measurements done also has to consider the 
possible presence of chemicals affecting materials under characteriza-
tion. Understanding the presence and the chemical form of reactive 
metals such as sodium, magnesium and aluminium can be very impor-
tant with respect to configuration for which the characterization is 
planned to be performed. In addition, data interpretation of neutronics 
measurements is substantially impacted by plutonium/uranium chemi-
cal form (UO2, PuO2, UF6, PuF4, etc.). 
Furthermore, the presence of some chemicals also affects the per-
formance of the detectors. Consideration must be given to the fact that 
very thin detector windows used for alpha and beta surface contami-
nation or for X-ray detection can easily be affected by corrosive chemical 
compounds. As pointed out before, some scintillation inorganic crystals, 
like NaI(Tl) or CsI(Na), are hygroscopic. For this reason, contact with 
strong organic solvents must be avoided, which may dissolve or soften 
epoxy hermetic seals used in these assemblies to protect the crystal 
(Saint-Gobain, 2016). 
2.2.4.3. Biological hazards. Biological pathogens and chemical toxins 
properties may also be important in some places, producing inaccessible 
and hazardous environments, particularly where decommissioning has 
been deferred. For example, algal growth in ponds or tanks can create 
organic rich sludge; bird or bat guano leading to the generation of the 
organic rich and biologically hazardous waste streams (World Nuclear 
Association, 2019). 
Moreover, the presence of gas generating from microbes within 
packaged waste has the potential to lead to package deformation and/or 
early loss of package as well as additional risks to workers to be exposed. 
Once again, this type of constraint that restricts the accessibility of 
people determines the measurement planning and the ways to carry it 
out. Automated or remotely controlled power tools may be helpful as 
they pose as ideal solutions to overcome these difficulties (Tsitsimpelis 
et al., 2019). 
2.3. Management constraints 
Once the technical means of characterization have been defined, 
these have to be implemented in a global scenario intervention (IAEA, 
1998, IAEA, 2007). This scenario is impacted by external constraints 
associated with resources (human/financial), safety and security rules, 
as well as the aspects regarding quality control and normative pre-
scriptions (IAEA, 2016). Note that the global scenario can thus influence 
the technical prescription. For instance, time devoted to measurement 
can be limited by aspects related to radiation protection, like the 
exposure dose rate in the environment being measured. 
These management constraints, which are very specific for each in-
dividual facility, are briefly described in this section. 
2.3.1. Resources 
Three different types of resources should be considered in the context 
of radiological characterization for the decommissioning of nuclear in-
stallations: staff requirements, financial resources and time. 
The NEA (NEA, 2013) describes the selection of strategies for per-
forming in-situ measurements. One of those that influence such opera-
tions is staff requirements. Team capabilities are of key importance 
when carrying out in-situ measurements. People in charge of these 
measurements must be properly trained, not only with regards to the 
equipment to be used and its technical specifications, but also in the 
radiological protection risks and challenges that exist in the area under 
measurement. 
Furthermore, financial resources and, indeed, technical resources 
have to be well established before attempting any activity of D&D. The 
D&D plans and associated cost estimates need to be prepared in 
advance, to ensure that sufficient financial resources are available, 
although they will evolve during the lifetime of the facility, becoming 
more detailed towards the end of the nuclear facility’s lifetime. They are 
really important because they undeniably limit the in-situ measurement 
plans. 
Another very limiting resource is linked with the needed time to 
perform the whole characterization strategy. Nevertheless, appropriate 
and careful planning of the characterization work may help to avoid all 
the above mentioned limitations, reducing costs, decreasing the time 
required to perform jobs and preventing possible delays. As what 
frequently happens with most projects, cost escalation often arises from 
very poor planning. 
2.3.2. Safety and radiation protection 
Safety and radiation protection are typically the most challenging 
constraints to be overcome. Not only dose limits defined by ICRP (ICRP, 
2007) or by international/national (NRC, 2007) regulations should be 
undertaken; but also other national regulations applying to protection of 
workers, general public and environment (IAEA, 2001). 
The investigation of contaminated sites shall involve site workers to 
close, and possible prolonged, contact with potentially hazardous ma-
terials. Therefore, health and safety should be a fundamental consider-
ation in the design and the selection of in-situ measurement methods. In- 
situ measurements personnel should be not only suitably trained but 
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also equipped (IAEA, 2006; IAEA, 2008). Planning should prescribe 
detailed working procedures, including monitoring and dosimetry 
equipment, protection clothing, identification of access, etc. 
A good understanding about the type of radioactive material, on 
which the radioactive measurement is made, is essential. It allows 
adaptation of the device used but also the performance of the risk 
analysis according to the radiological properties. For example, the 
quantification of fissile mass in equipment by gamma spectrometry has 
to trigger a criticality risk analysis, because shields used to reduce the 
background radiation measured, could constitute a reflector for 
neutrons. 
In-situ measurements techniques should be designed in such a way as 
not to contribute to the further spread of contamination on site, or off 
site. This is of particular concern when dealing with radioactive 
contamination. In the case of contaminated areas, it may be necessary to 
limit their access to only specially trained site workers, and also 
allowing for a decontamination zone for both the equipment and the 
personnel. 
The safety analysis of the in-situ operation, includes an impact 
assessment due to the different operations planned and hypothetical 
accidental situations. In addition, it should underline the types of safety 
and radiological protection required for the protection of workers, the 
general public and, of course, the environment. 
This analysis may lead to the use of alternative ways to assess the 
radiological status, like automated and remotely controlled power tools, 
for example, using robots in the case of hot cells or in highly contami-
nated areas (Tsitsimpelis et al., 2019). 
2.3.3. Security 
Regarding security issue, there should be an awareness of safety 
considerations of installations, the workforce, the local public and the 
environment during in-situ measurements operations in D&D projects. 
Setting up adequate security is an important and mandatory issue, as 
unauthorised invasions or malicious acts such as sabotage, damage, 
theft, loss or unauthorised use of equipment or installations may 
happen. Technical security measures include fencing protected areas, 
access control, security illumination, security management systems and 
monitoring systems in order to ensure contaminated material is not 
spread from the site and the public does not have access to the site, 
thereby ensuring their protection (IAEA, 2016). Thus, to ensure all these 
security measures more personnel in D&D tasks may be required than 
during the routine operation of the installation. 
Security management systems include information security, workers 
training and access control. Workers must be suitably trained and 
qualified to complete the activities assigned to them in the specific area 
they have to carry out measurements. A training programme should be 
developed so as to ensure that the workers involved are provided with 
the necessary level of knowledge and skills to fulfil each task specified in 
the measurement plan that guarantees overall security. (IAEA, 2006; 
IAEA, 2008). 
Throughout the different phases of any D&D programme the security 
level changes. Once the fuel, process fluids and operational waste are 
removed from the site the main radiological and security hazards have 
disappear and less equipment is needed and areas protected. 
2.3.4. Quality assurance and quality control 
Any planning of collecting and evaluating in-situ measurement data 
must be concerned with ensuring the right characterization information 
that has to be gathered as well as the results and their evaluation are of 
an appropriate quality. This is a guarantee of meeting the character-
ization objectives. 
This, of course, requires proper equipment selection and its adequate 
control. Tools, gauges, instruments, together with other measuring and 
test equipment (including software) used in determining item status, 
shall be of the proper range, type, accuracy and precision. Almost all of 
them should be protected from damage or deterioration during 
handling, maintenance and storage. 
Suitable calibration procedures are essential to provide confidence in 
the measurements. In the time between calibrations, the equipment 
should also receive a performance check prior to use and periodically 
during use. When using portable equipment a daily check is recom-
mended when in use. The selection, identification, use, checking and 
calibration requirements, in addition to checking and calibration fre-
quency of all measuring and test equipment, should be specified. During 
in-situ measurements, it is advisable to carry out a certain number of 
repeated measurements as part of the quality control. 
The responsibility for measuring and test equipment controls should 
be defined and included in the process of characterization as well as 
maintaining the records of calibration and checking results. Some in-
formation could be obtained mainly from MARSSIM (MARSSIM, 2000) 
but also from ISO standard 17025 (ISO, 2017) and from MARLAP 
(MARLAP, 2004) procedures. 
Establishing and implementing a quality plan is the safest mean to 
ensure all these aspects are met or, at least, a specific procedure that 
defines how measuring equipment is calibrated, the frequency of cali-
bration, a suitable identification of calibration status, its detailed 
maintenance operations (including scheduled services and checks) and, 
finally, how to protect equipment from damage. 
3. Methodology for constrained environments classification 
This section describes the methodology followed to obtain a classi-
fication and a categorization of the constrained environment present in 
the different areas existing in nuclear/radioactive installations. This 
methodology includes the previous identification and classification of 
the installations that could be involved in in-situ radiological charac-
terization and also of the different areas, which may be contained in 
these facilities. 
In this paper the word “area” is used to describe not only a certain 
room in the installations but also a specific place (i.e. equipment, 
building or ducts) inside the facility with similar radiological charac-
teristics and constraints. In this context, it should be considered that an 
area can be included in different rooms (i.e. a duct) or to be a room (i.e. 
equipment room); can be small (i.e. office) or high (i.e. reactor cavity) 
also depending on the facility. 
After that, for each constraint category previously identified, a spe-
cific table is produced. In these tables, areas are linked to the different 
installations, and the impact level of the constraint is categorized. 
It should be also considered that, depending on the constraint 
considered, its impact level in a specific area can be variable depending 
on the different phases of any D&D programme. These phases should be 
summarized as follows:  
 Initial – Dismantling phase: The main objectives are estimations of 
fissile mass quantity or radioactive level of existing waste.  
 Intermediate - Remediation phase: If consideration on the primary 
characterization led to a decision to undertake remediation, then the 
intermediate stage starts and a more detailed characterization would 
be necessary to facilitate decisions to be made about the appropriate 
remediation method.  
 Final – Release phase: It occurs only after the completion of the 
dismantling work and the justification for reaching the end state 
targeted by the operator. During this final characterization stage, the 
objectives are often to determine residual contamination or under-
ground contamination. It enables obtaining the lifting of the regu-
latory controls to which a basic nuclear installation is subjected to. 
Often, in this phase, the number of in-situ measurements strongly 
decreases and the major part of the characterization is focused on the 
in-lab analysis. 
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3.1. Type of installation 
There are a great number of installations with different possibilities 
of use (exploitation, storage, maintenance) than can be involved in D&D 
scenarios requiring radiological characterization by in-situ measure-
ments that they can be classified in four big groups, as follows:  
 Reactors:  
 power generating reactors,  
 research reactors,  
 training reactors,  
 Plants:  
 uranium mining and milling plants,  
 uranium enrichment plants,  
 uranium converting plants,  
 fuel fabricating plants,  
 spent fuel reprocessing plants,  
 other fuel facilities,  
 radioisotope production plants, 
Table 1 
Type of areas considered.  
Outdoor Office Personal 
airlock 
Grid hot 
cells 
Secondary 
cooling 
system 
Foundations- 
Structural 
Materials 
and apron 
Service room Truck bay Waste hot 
cells 
Tanks 
Traffic 
Corridor 
Equipment room Hot cells Process hot 
cells 
Spent fuel 
pit 
Technical 
galleries 
Peripheral 
galleries 
Hot cells 
front area 
Process 
ducts 
Refueling 
cavity 
Waste storage Process control 
room 
Hot cells 
back area 
Ventilation 
ducts 
Reactor 
cavity 
Technical area Decontamination 
room 
Cleaning 
hot cells 
Chimney  
Changing room Equipment airlock Storage 
hot cells 
Reactor 
coolant 
system   
Fig. 3. Pictures of some areas according to Table 1.  
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Table 2 
Classification of areas according to the radioactivity constraint category.  
Areas Type of installation Phase Contamination Gamma Dose rate Neutron Dose rate Radiation flux 
Outdoor All Final very low no no no 
Foundations-Structural Materials and apron All Final very low no no no 
Traffic Corridor All Intermediate 
Final 
very low no no no 
Technical galleries All Intermediate 
Final 
very low no no no 
Waste storage All Initial very low high high no 
Technical area All Final very low no no no 
Changing room All Final very low no no no 
Office All Final very low no no no 
Service room All Final very low no no no 
Equipment room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final 
low low low low 
Peripheral galleries Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final 
low low low low 
Process control room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final no no no no 
Decontamination room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
high low low no 
Equipment airlock Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate 
Final 
low no no no 
Personal airlock Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate 
Final 
low no no no 
Truck bay Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final low no no no 
Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high no 
Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final high high nigh no 
Hot Cells front area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final 
low no no no 
Hot Cells back area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
high high high no 
Cleaning Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
high low low no 
Storage Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate low very high very high no 
Storage Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Final low high high no 
Grid Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
high low low no 
Waste Hot cells Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
low very high very high no 
Waste Hot cells Plants 
Accelerators 
Final low high high no 
Process Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high no 
Process Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Final high high high no 
Process ducts Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high no 
Process ducts Reactors 
Plants 
Final high high high no 
Ventilation ducts All Intermediate low no No no 
Chimney All Final low no No no 
Reactor coolant system Reactors Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high no 
Reactor coolant system Reactors Final high high high no 
Secondary cooling system Reactors Intermediate low no no no 
Tanks All Initial very high very high very high no 
Tanks All Intermediate high high high no 
Spent fuel pit Reactors 
Plant 
Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high no 
(continued on next page) 
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 nuclear maintenance workshop,  
 storage facilities,  
 waste management facilities,  
 Accelerators,  
 Other installations for industrial or medical applications:  
 irradiation facilities,  
 testing laboratories,  
 research laboratories. 
3.2. Type of areas 
Each one of the above mentioned installations have different areas 
where the various constraints can affect the choice of the equipment to 
be used to carry out in-situ measurements. These areas can be included 
under the general terms shown in Table 1. 
Of course, not all these areas exist in all facilities and neither this 
relation claims to be exhaustive, but the most common ones are 
included. 
Fig. 3 shows some different examples of the definition of “area” in 
this paper, having different size and structure. 
The classification of the constrained environments has been done 
linking the installations and areas inside them with the different con-
straints mentioned before and can be found in different tables shown in 
the following section. 
4. Classification 
Several tables (Table 2–5) have been generated one for each 
constraint category previously identified (Radioactivity, Materials, 
Accessibility, Environment). Each table includes for each area listed in 
Table 1, the installation(s) concerned, the decommissioning phase(s) 
when the constraint category has to be considered and the impact ex-
pected for each one of the specific constraints considered included in 
this category. When for an area in all the installations the impact of the 
entire specific constrains do not exist, the line (register) is deleted from 
the Table to only provide in the Tables relevant data for the constraint 
category considered. In fact, the whole set of installations and areas do 
not appear in every table but only those relevant for the constraint 
category considered. 
The presence of a particular constraint is quoted in a conservative 
approach and is pointed out with an x. However, in the case of radio-
activity constraints, they are quoted different level of constraint mainly 
considered in decommissioning process (from very low to very high). Of 
course, for a given area, radioactivity constraint level decreases during 
the decommissioning process, from initial to intermediate and final 
phases. 
Not only theoretical knowledge, but also practical experience have 
been used to develop these Tables. 
As expected, radioactivity is the constraint category that is mostly 
present in all areas at all time. There are many areas in which access is 
constrained primarily due to the risks and measurement problems 
caused by high levels of radiation exposure. However, the radioactive 
dose rates and contamination levels change along the decommissioning 
process; irradiation constraints are mainly present during the 
decommissioning process and pre-dismantling phase and they should 
decrease in the remediation and final phase. Their levels are higher in 
reactors and plants, mainly in areas related to fuels and radioactive 
sources. In these same areas and depending on the form of the radio-
active sources, the contamination constraint is also present in a large 
extent. In the final phase of the D&D process the radioactive constraint 
decreases its relevance but contamination can be found even in offices or 
service areas. 
These high levels affect the choice of the in-situ equipment, from 
sealed equipment, to prevent its contamination, to the use of telescopic 
devices or robots to prevent the radiation exposure to the workers and 
the appropriate selection of the gamma or neutron detector device 
depending on the particle field present in the area under measurement, 
as explained in section 2.2.1. 
Regarding materials constraints, attention should be paid to the fact 
that different and complicated ranges of ambient conditions of tem-
perature, humidity and pressure or aqueous conditions can be found in 
different locations from almost every installation, as well as constraints 
related to fact of having radioactivity distributed in concrete or metal. 
However, the occurrence of ground material is only observed in outdoor 
situations. The impact of these constraints in the selection of the in-situ 
equipment is completely different; the consistency constraints mainly 
affect workers safety and measurement data interpretation. However, 
liquid and air constraints only have a strong effect on the equipment to 
be used, from strongly sealed detectors and electronics to the careful 
selection of detectors depending to their response to temperature and air 
density changes and also their resistance to the humidity conditions. 
Attention should be also paid to the response of the electronics and in-
terfaces to these changes. See section 2.2.2. for more details. 
Other environmental hazards due to the presence of toxic atmo-
spheres is a constraint that is not frequently found. Asbestos is restricted 
to some technical and peripheral galleries or some ducts and do not 
directly affect the equipment to be used for in-situ measurements. The 
presence of chemical and biological hazards is found in all D&D phases 
practically around hot cells, waste storage facilities and in some ducts; 
biological hazards do not directly affect the equipment to be used for in- 
situ measurements but the chemicals ones do and the hygroscopic 
characteristics of some devices and the endurance of the detector win-
dow before choosing the equipment should be considered. See section 
2.2.4. Of course, to prevent the impact of these hazards in the workers, 
telescopic or robot devices could be used. 
Accessibility constraints also appear in almost all the areas at all time 
and D&D phases. Configuration constraint can be found in different 
areas in almost all installations and they strongly affect the selection of 
the equipment needed to carry out the in–situ measurements, see section 
2.2.3. for more details. In the case of subsurface constraints it should be 
considered that the access to subsurface distributions is usually made 
not in the initial phase, when detailed characterization is necessary, as 
subsurface contaminants are commonly present in structural materials 
that adsorb radionuclides or are activated. So this accessibility 
constraint related to subsurface is easily found in substructures, foun-
dations and structural materials, in some galleries and in different out-
door characterization, mainly in the final phase. They also strongly 
affect the selection of the in-situ equipment; in the case of gamma 
Table 2 (continued ) 
Areas Type of installation Phase Contamination Gamma Dose rate Neutron Dose rate Radiation flux 
Spent fuel pit Reactors 
Plant 
Final high high high no 
Refueling cavity Reactors 
Plant 
Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high no 
Refueling cavity Reactors 
Plant 
Final high high high no 
Reactor cavity Reactors Initial 
Intermediate 
very high very high very high high 
Reactor cavity Reactors Final high high high high  
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Table 3 
Classification of areas according to the materials constraint category.   
Air Liquid Consistency 
Areas Type of 
installation 
Phase Pressure Temperature Flow Immersive Humidity Metal Concrete Ground 
Outdoor All Final  x x     x 
Foundations-Structural Materials and 
apron 
All Final       x  
Traffic Corridor All Intermediate 
Final       
x  
Technical galleries All Intermediate 
Final       
x  
Waste storage All Initial  x    x   
Technical area All Final       x  
Changing room All Final       x  
Office All Final       x  
Service room All Final       x  
Equipment room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final  
x    x x  
Peripheral galleries Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final  
x   x  x  
Process control room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final       x  
Decontamination room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
x x    x x  
Equipment airlock Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate 
Final      
x x  
Personal airlock Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate 
Final      
x x  
Truck bay Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final       x  
Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
x x    x x  
Hot Cells front area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final      
x x  
Hot Cells back area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x    x x  
Cleaning Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x   x x   
Storage Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate 
Final  
x     x  
Grid Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final     
x x   
Waste Hot cells Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final      
x   
Process Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
x x  x x x   
Process ducts Reactors 
Plants 
Initial x x x x x    
Ventilation ducts All Intermediate   x  x    
Chimney All Final   x   x   
Reactor coolant system Reactors Initial x x  x  x   
Secondary cooling system Reactors Intermediate x x  x  x   
Tanks All Initial 
Intermediate 
x   x  x   
Spent fuel pit Reactors 
Plant 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x  x  x x  
Refueling cavity Reactors 
Plant 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x  x  x x  
Reactor cavity Reactors Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
x x  x  x x   
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spectrometers the most rugged have poor energy resolution and those 
with better resolutions are more fragile; in any case a strict sealing of the 
equipment is required. 
Analysing these Tables from the point of view of the areas, it can be 
concluded that the most challenging areas for in-situ measurement are 
hot process ones (Hot cells, Ducts, Pit, Tanks), and reactors primary 
environment (Coolant system, fuel pit, refueling cavity and of course 
reactor cavity). Realizations of in-situ-measurements in these areas are 
not only subjected to high irradiation and contamination constraints but 
also to other constraints such as temperature or immersive measure-
ment. In addition, the lack of familiarity of interventions in these areas, 
the complex phenomenon that can occur (i.e. presence of alpha emitters, 
criticality constraints, phenomenon of activation), make the interven-
tion process very challenging. 
On the contrary, all peripheral areas (i.e. technical galleries, process 
control room, service room) are not considered as areas of high level 
constraint for in-situ measurement. However, constraint of accessibility 
of these areas must be particularly considered while preparing the 
intervention, because they are not usually designed for facilitating 
heavy materials access. 
A particular approach needs to be deployed concerning outdoor or 
foundations characterization, because of the major risk of contamina-
tion dissemination during investigations operations. 
5. Conclusions 
Once defined the investigation objectives for radiological charac-
terization of either one particular nuclear site/installation or a specific 
area inside it, the most suitable investigation methodology, for in-situ 
measurements, should be defined as well as the proper equipment and 
protocols to be used. The selection of that in situ investigation meth-
odology depends on various challenges to be overcome or constraints to 
be taken into account. 
In this paper, the decision process that goes from the definition of the 
characterization objectives to the definition of the in situ investigation 
method (in-situ equipment, methods and protocol) has been analysed 
considering different challenges belonging to the system definition and 
to the intervention definition. 
The main focus of this paper is the system definition that is related to 
technical problems or environmental constraints that challenge the 
choice of the equipment; inside it different categories of constraints are 
defined: radioactivity, materials, accessibility and other non-radiation 
environmental hazards. The various characteristics that can be 
included in each one of these categories are defined and described and 
their impact in the detection systems is briefly summarized. 
Once the different environmental constraints and their challenges 
are analysed, a classification and categorization of different constrained 
Table 4 
Classification of areas according to the environment constraint category.   
Abestos Chemical Organic/biological 
Areas Type of installation Phase Abestos Reactive metals Volatile organic compounds Pathogens Chemical toxins 
Technical galleries All Intermediate 
Final 
x     
Waste storage All Initial  x  x x 
Technical area All Final x x x x x 
Equipment room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Peripheral galleries Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final 
x     
Decontamination room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x    
Truck bay Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final x     
Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Hot Cells front area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final    
x x 
Hot Cells back area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Cleaning Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Storage Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Grid Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Waste Hot cells Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Process Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x x x 
Process ducts Reactors 
Plants 
Initial x x x x x 
Ventilation ducts All Intermediate x     
Tanks All Initial 
Intermediate    
x x  
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environments in the D&D process activities has been accomplished by 
listing the most important installations where in-situ measurements 
could be accomplished. Reactors, (power generating and research), 
plants (uranium enrichment, fuel converting, fabricating, spent fuel 
processing, other fuel facilities, radioelement production, nuclear 
maintenance workshop, storage facilities, low-level rad-waste facilities); 
accelerators and other installations (irradiation facilities, testing and 
research laboratories) have been considered for this classification. 
Although only three different possibilities of use of the above 
mentioned installations exist (exploitation, storage, maintenance), we 
have considered that each installation is constituted by different areas 
where the four identified environmental constraints can affect them in 
different ways. Specifically, we consider that these areas can be grouped 
into 33 different types shown in Table 1. 
Last but not least, the classification has been accomplished produc-
ing several tables, one for each constraint, where areas are linked to 
installations and to the specific properties of the constraints. For each 
one of these constraints also differences among the various phases of a 
given D&D programme (Initial –, Dismantling phase; Intermediate - 
Remediation phase, if needed, and Final – Release phase) have been 
outlined. In the case of radiological constraint, the impact of it in the 
different areas has been categorized from very low to very high. 
As a general conclusion and as expected, it is in the nuclear power 
plants where the number of constraints and its categorization are the 
highest and where the need of well-defined methodologies and in-situ 
equipment is more challenging. 
This study serves to establish the different constrained environments 
that arise in radiological characterization, through in situ measure-
ments, during nuclear decommissioning and dismantling operations and 
the way they are affected and challenged by the constraints, so the next 
step would be an analysis of suitability of existing methodologies for in- 
situ measurements in all the constrained environment described here. 
CRediT authorship contribution statement 
Frederic Aspe: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing - review & 
editing. Raquel Idoeta: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing - re-
view & editing. Gregoire Auge: Conceptualization, Methodology, 
Writing - review & editing. Margarita Herranz: Conceptualization, 
Methodology, Writing - review & editing. 
Acknowledgements 
The INSIDER project received funding from the European Union (EU) 
HORIZON 2020 - Euratom Research and Training Programme 
2014–2018 under grant agreement No 755554. 
Appendix A. Supplementary data 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi. 
Table 5 
Classification of areas according to the accessibility constraint category.  
Areas Type of installation Phase Tunnel Height Clutter Subsurface 
Outdoor All Final    x 
Foundations-Structural Materials and apron All Final x  x x 
Traffic Corridor All Intermediate 
Final    
x 
Technical galleries All Intermediate 
Final 
x x x x 
Technical area All Final  x   
Equipment room Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final  
x   
Peripheral galleries Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final 
x x x  
Truck bay Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Final  x   
Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final   
x  
Hot Cells front area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x  
Hot Cells back area Reactors 
Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x x  
Cleaning Hot Cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x   
Waste Hot cells Plants 
Accelerators 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final  
x   
Process Hot cells Reactors 
Plants 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
x x x  
Process ducts Reactors 
Plants 
Initial x x x  
Ventilation ducts All Intermediate  x x  
Chimney All Final  x   
Tanks All Initial 
Intermediate 
x  x  
Refueling cavity Reactors 
Plant 
Initial 
Intermediate 
Final 
x  x   
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